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THE U.K. APPLIES TO JOIN 




The U.K’s request to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) could be a tremendous boon for this bloc. The CPTPP has 
11 members at present, including Canada. However, four members — Peru, Chile, 
Malaysia and Brunei — have yet to complete the ratification process. The U.K.’s 
potential accession could lead the CPTPP to develop further in response to 
renewed interest from present and prospective members. 
Canada and the U.K. have already been discussing interim trading arrangements 
in the form of the Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA), which replaces existing 
rules designed when the U.K. was still a member of the European Union. Both 
countries have committed to reaching a new, permanent bilateral agreement by 
2024. If the U.K. joins the CPTPP, Canada will thus end up negotiating two trade 
agreements with the same country at the same time.
Canada is unlikely to win additional access to the U.K. market beyond what it 
enjoys through the TCA. At the same time, Canada is unlikely to grant the U.K. 
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additional access to protected sectors through the CPTPP. But this doesn’t mean that 
Canada has nothing to gain from the U.K. joining the CPTPP.
The addition of a substantial economy like the U.K. to the CPTPP could prompt the four 
foot-dragging members to complete ratification. Without that, they will have no say in 
the negotiations over the U.K.’s accession or the outcome. The U.K.’s experience could 
also encourage non-members like South Korea and Taiwan to take the plunge and apply 
to join the pact. 
The United States was an original member of the CPTPP’s precursor, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, but pulled out during the Trump administration. The U.K’s entry may not 
be enough to convince the new government to change course and so far, the Biden 
administration has not signalled that accession is a priority.
Still, the U.K.’s admission has the potential to expand the trading bloc and Canada should 
make the most of this. It does require the careful adjustment of any potential Canadian 
concessions granted as part of the CPTPP accession negotiations against the need for 
leverage in future bilateral trade negotiations with the U.K. But this balancing act shouldn’t 
prevent Canada from supporting the U.K.’s request to join the CPTPP. The opportunities 
and rewards over the long term are too substantial for any other decision. 
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After months of speculation, on February 1 the United Kingdom finally pulled the 
trigger on its formal application to accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, (“the Agreement”) the 11-country regional trading bloc 
that encompasses four countries in North and South America that border on the 
Pacific (Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile), five countries in Asia (Japan, Vietnam, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei) and two countries in the South Pacific (Australia 
and New Zealand). The U.K.’s entry would provide a very elastic definition to the 
term “trans-Pacific” and if Britain does finally accede to the Agreement, a name 
change might be in order. 
Britain’s formal request1 to begin accession negotiations could open the way to 
broader expansion, bringing in a number of other economies that have expressed 
varying degrees of interest in becoming part of the Agreement. These include 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and even China. And 
off in the wings is the United States, one of the original Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) 12. The U.S. was one of the main advocates for the original TPP, signed it, 
but then pulled out2 when Donald Trump took office. Britain’s application will 
pose some questions for Canada, given that Canada and the U.K. already have an 
interim bilateral agreement. However, it should prove beneficial for the CPTPP itself, 
including possibly spurring the delayed ratification by four of the original members. 
The CPTPP has been in effect since late December 2018 when six of the 11 
signatories confirmed their ratification with the treaty’s depository nation, New 
Zealand. Vietnam joined those original six countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore) a few weeks later, but the remaining four 
members have yet to complete the ratification process. Given the current turbulent 
state of internal politics in these countries (Chile, Peru and Malaysia), ratification has 
been delayed and at the moment there are no signs that this is going to change. 
(Brunei is not facing the same internal issues, but given its close geographical and 
economic links to Malaysia, it is unlikely to move on accession before Malaysia). 
Until now, this lack of accession by several members provided a good reason 
to defer the question of expansion, but with the U.K. now forcing the issue, the 
modalities of enlarging the Agreement need to be addressed. CPTPP ministers will 
have to formulate a response. 
Normally, prior to submitting a formal request to begin accession negotiations, 
an aspirant country will conduct informal negotiations with the existing members. 
Existing members need to do an econometric analysis to gauge the benefits of 
including a new economy, and most countries undertake public consultation to 
determine what potential gains to seek and which sensitive sectors to protect 




economy according to the IMF’s 2020 estimates,3 would considerably expand the 
CPTPP’s economic clout.
The U.K. has already held discussions with Canada over the interim trade pact, 
known as the Trade Continuity Agreement4 (TCA), which replaces the existing 
rules governing Canada-U.K. trade under the 2017 Canada-European Union 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The transition period 
governing the U.K.’s departure from the EU expired on December 31, 2020, and 
from that date CETA rules no longer governed Canada’s trade with Britain. The 
two sides reached agreement on the interim arrangement to ensure no disruption 
of bilateral trade as Brexit was finally implemented. Both parties have committed 
to negotiating a new, permanent bilateral agreement with a notional target date of 
2024. If an accession working group is established to negotiate the U.K.’s accession 
to the CPTPP, Canada will be negotiating two agreements simultaneously with the 
U.K., complicating matters somewhat (since market access will be negotiated among 
and apply to all CPTPP participants), but also allowing for some efficiencies. A very 
real constraint for many countries is the limited number of trade experts available to 
undertake complex negotiations, and the time that such negotiations take. 
Given that Canada has already reviewed trade issues with Britain, this should 
facilitate a Canadian response. The U.K. has undoubtedly had preliminary 
discussions with other CPTPP partners as well, given that it already has bilateral 
deals with Japan and Vietnam, and Peru (through the Andean Community), 
transitional deals with Chile, Mexico and Singapore in addition to Canada, and is 
currently in negotiations with Australia and New Zealand. Once CPTPP ministers 
agree to form an accession working group to negotiate U.K. accession, chief 
negotiators will convene to discuss their approach, and the applicant, in this case 
Britain, will be expected to put forward its market access offer. 
Why would Canada support U.K. entry? Canada is unlikely to gain much by way 
of any additional access to the U.K. market beyond what it enjoys already through 
the TCA, and if it is to seek additional concessions, these are more likely to come 
through future bilateral negotiations. By the same token, Canada will be reluctant to 
grant any additional market access to Britain, in particular with respect to sensitive 














industries have already vociferously complained about the limited additional access 
granted to the U.S. and EU in the updated NAFTA (CUSMA) and CETA agreements, 
and to Australia and New Zealand, among others, in the CPTPP. In response, the 
federal government has allocated hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation 
to the affected industries. 
In the TCA, Britain gained no additional access to supply-managed sectors.5 The 
existing import quotas under CETA for these products will now be shared among 
the 27 EU members, rather than 28 now that Britain is no longer an EU member. 
Canada will certainly not be interested in granting any additional access to supply-
managed industries, especially dairy, to the U.K. in CPTPP negotiations. For their 
part, Australia and New Zealand will not be interested in sharing the limited 
Canadian dairy quota they were granted in the CPTPP with Britain. This will be a 
difficult file. 
While it might appear that Canada has little to gain in terms of direct improved 
access to the British market from U.K. participation in the CPTPP, there could 
be significant longer-term benefits in supporting U.K. accession. These relate 
primarily to the impact an economy like Britain will have in expanding the reach 
and scope of the CPTPP, and in providing the impetus for further expansion of 
CPTPP membership. British accession could even spur on lagging ratification 
efforts in the four remaining CPTPP members that have signed but not 
implemented the Agreement. 
The incentive for the four non-ratifying states to move on early ratification is that 
unless and until they ratify and become active members applying the disciplines of 
the Agreement, they will have no say in the decision-making process leading to the 
opening of accession negotiations, no vote on whether to admit the U.K. (or others), 
no ability to take part in the negotiations and no role in determining the final 
outcome. However, they will clearly be impacted if the U.K. joins the Agreement, 
especially if they don’t accede until after this occurs. Sitting on the sidelines may 
not be the best option and we may see some movement in the ratification process 
in at least some of the remaining four signatories. 
Another advantage that U.K. membership may bring is to break the logjam for 
other potentially interested countries. Until Britain made the first move, there 
had been an element of “kabuki theatre” with regard to who was ready to take 
the plunge and formally apply. The original 11 members had not all ratified, the 
COVID-19 pandemic had impacted global trade and distracted attention and no one 
5 The TCA contains a side letter granting the U.K. access to cheese tariff rate quotas (TRQ) under the reserve 
for the European Union within Canada’s WTO cheese TRQ until no later than December 31, 2023. After this 
date, cheese originating in the U.K. shall be eligible to be imported under the reserve for non-European 
Union WTO members within Canada’s WTO cheese TRQ. Canada and the U.K. will endeavour to reach an 
arrangement on cheese as part of the expected bilateral negotiations, no later than June 30, 2023. These 
multilateral TRQs are not part of the cheese access granted to the EU as part of CETA. 
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wanted to be rebuffed. Among the economies interested in following the U.K., the 
two most likely to step forward initially are Korea and Taiwan.6 They will be happy 
to watch and learn from the British experience in order to better prepare for their 
own accession process. 
Will the United States come back to the Agreement under President Joe Biden? 
Rejoining does not seem to be an immediate priority for the Biden administration. 
The Democratic Party has never been a strong advocate for liberalized trade, but 
geopolitical considerations could cause the U.S. to reconsider eventually. As for 
China, its expressed interest7 seems to be more in the nature of a place-holder as 
it would have to substantially open a number of closed sectors of its economy and 
agree to disciplines on support for state-owned enterprises that would run counter 
to current Chinese economic policy. But the fact that China has not closed the door 
is a positive sign. 
It is encouraging that Britain has made the first move. Negotiating U.K. entry 
into the CPTPP will pose some challenges for Canada, given the need to balance 
any concessions it gains or grants within the Agreement against negotiating 
coinage that it may need in future bilateral negotiations with Britain. However, U.K. 
participation in the CPTPP will give the Agreement a boost in terms of expanded 
scope, economic benefit and future expanded membership. That is well worth 
supporting, and I expect that Canada will join other CPTPP members in giving a 
green light to Britain’s request to negotiate accession. That’s when the hard work 
will begin. 
6 It is worth noting that Canada already has a bilateral free trade agreement with Korea, which went into effect 
in 2015. It has no trade agreement with Taiwan, but Taiwan is a member of the WTO and already has bilateral 
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